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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---~~~~~~-~~~~~-~~-~~~-~-~~~~~-----~~--~-~---~~-~---------------~

ROBERT

s.

ROBERT~·

FREDERICKSEN, aka
FREDERICKSON,
Appellant,
vs.

KNIGHT LAND CORPORATION,
a Corporation,
Respondent.

I.

..
.
..
.
.
..
.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Case No. 18131

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action by Appellant on a written agreement made
between the parties whereby,
Respondent,

for

compensation received,

Knight Land Corporation,

promised

to pay to

Appellant, Robert Fredericksen, the sum of $10,000.00 plus 10%
thereon or,

at Appellant's option,

convey to him sufficient

acreage of certain property known as Jeremy Ranch at a rate of
$85.00 per acre to satisfy said payment obligation.

II.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The Third Judicial District Court, Honorable Peter F. Leary,
entered judgment of "no cause of action" against Appellant on all
claims set forth in his Complaint based on a Stipulated Statement
of Facts and various legal memoranda submitted by the parties.

1
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III.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant asks this Court to reverse the judgment of the
District Court and to remand for entering of judgment in favor of
Appellant pursuant to the claims in his Complaint.
IV.

,

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about the 1st day of November,

1961,

Respondent,

Knight Land Corporation, as buyer, entered into an agreement with
East Salt Lake Investment Company (ESLIC), as seller, whereby
Respondent was given the option to purchase approximately 16,500
acres of land known as the Jeremy Ranch (R. 231).
said agreement,

Pursuant to

Respondent took possession of the entire Jeremy

Ranch property, received the right to purchase said property for
$1,400,000.00, and agreed to make annual installment payments to
ESLIC toward satisfaction of said purchase price (R. 231, 244264).

However,

Respondent did not hold nor could it deliver

title to any of the property to any other party until money was
received by ESLIC sufficient to release a portion of the property
( R.

59 ) •

Sometime prior to the 31st day of December, 1963, Appellant
contributed $10,000.00 to and became a limited partner in a
partnership known as Huntington Park Investment Company.

Said

partnership entered into an agreement with Respondent whereby the
Partnership would make the downpayment on Respondent's contract
with ESLIC and pay by installments certain sums to Respondent as
consideration for conveyance from Respondent of approximately
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2

5,000 acres of Jeremy Ranch.

After making the required down

payment, the Partnership defaulted in its agreement with
Respondent (R.

231-232).

On the 31st day of December, 1963, Respondent entered into a
written Agreement with

Appellant and

other

members of

the

Partnership by the terms of which Appellant agreed to release his
interest in and to the Jeremy Ranch property, and Respondent
agreed to pay to Appellant the sum of $10,000.00 together with
10% thereon (R. 233).
evidence,

A copy of said Agreement was received in

attached to the Stipulation of Facts (R.

Said Agreement provides,

inter alia:

276-285).

That Appellant had

"individually" paid to Respondent $10,000.00; that Respondent
promised to repay that sum together with 10% thereon from "50
percent of the gross profits actually realized by Knight from the
resale of lands acquired by Knight from the Jeremy Ranch"; that
"all sums received by Knight from the resale of any of the Jeremy
Ranch land in excess of $85.00 per acre shall be considered to be
gross profits"; that Appellant acknowledged familiarity with the
terms of Respondent's contract with

ESLIC because of which

Appellant's right to repayment was conditioned upon the payments
to ESLIC being kept current allowing the release of resellable
land to Respondent; that if all sums had not been advanced by
Respondent by July 1, 1968, Appellant "may request Knight to
convey .
Knight .

•

•

sufficient of the acreage theretofore released to
at the rate of $85.00 per

•

acre

to satisfy and

discharge any remaining unpaid balance"; and that any breaching
party

thereto

should

pay all

court
3

costs

and

a
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reasonable

attorney's fee incurred for enforcement of the agreement (R. 276285), Sections 1, 2, 3, 8, 16).

Between the 31st day of December, 1963 and the 8th day of
May,

there were a number

1970,

Respondent,

of sales of

the

land by

all of which were for more than $85.00 per acre.

Said sales were necessitated by the annual payments due under the
ESLIC agreement.

Each year, only so much property was released

and sold as would provide Respondent with sufficient funds to
meet the annual obligation.

All proceeds from the said sales

were completely exhausted by costs of sales or in satisfaction of
the ESLIC obligation (R. 239).

In fact, there were no proceeds

received by the Respondent from any of these sales which were not
required by ESLIC as a condition to the release of the sold
property.

In each

instance of

sale,

the deed

either

went

directly from ESLIC to the third-party buyer or was transferred
through Respondent immediately to the third-party buyer, and the
money similarly was transferred either directly from said buyer
to ESLIC, or through Respondent immediately to ESLIC.

Respondent

did not ever have control of the proceeds of said sales, nor
could it deliver title to the released properties to Appellant
( R.

59 I

23 6 ) •

On the 8th day of May,

1970,

Respondent entered into a

written agreement with Emigration Land Company (Emigration) by
the

terms of

which

Respondent

interest in Jeremy Ranch for

sold

on contract all of its

the sum of $2,100,000.00.

remaining acreage was approximately 12,500 acres.

4

The

Pursuant to
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that agreement,

Respondent received the sum of $500,00.00 as

downpayment on or about the date of execution of the contract and
payments of $75,000.00 in 1971 and 1972.

In 1973, Respondent

discounted the balance of the purchase price which was thereupon
paid in f u 11 ( R. 2 3 7- 2 3 8 ) •
Upon receipt of the $500,000.00 downpayment from Emigration
pursuant to the aforementioned agreement of sale, Respondent had,
for the first time, more proceeds than were required to pay to
ESLIC on the option obligation (R. 59, 60).

However, the subject

Agreement with Appellant allowed Respondent to "retain the first
$85.00 per acre paid" on each sale before any gross profits would
be realized (R. 277, Section 2(c)).
paid out of

50

percent of

Appellant was only to be

the gross profits of each

sale.

Furthermore, Responent had no title to any of the property until
October, 1974, at which time Emigration transferred 10 acres to
Respondent in final settlement of the contract balance (R. 55).
Neither Appellant nor any other partners of the Partnership
received any sums of money or any land from Respondent pursuant
to the subject Agreement prior to the year 1973 (R.
paragraph l(x)).

194,

In 1974, former partners of Appellant, also

parties to the subject Agreement, were paid certain sums of money
and given land by Respondent for settlement of a civil action
filed by those individuals on the subject Agreement (R.
paragraph 5(a-d).

233-234,

Appellant asserted before the Court herein

that prior to said settlement,

he had been encouraged by

Respondent's agent, James L. Knight, not to become a party to

5
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that lawsuit and was verbally assured that he would be paid (R.
3 32) .

After

numerous attempts to receive satisfaction of the

contractual debt and subsequent to a period of convalescing from
a severe heart attack, Appellant caused a written demand to be
served upon Respondent on the 7th day of February, 1978.

A copy

of said demand was received in evidence, attached to the
Stipulation of Facts (R. 324-327).

In said demand, Appellant

exercised his contractual option to request payment in the form
of land as provided in the subject Agreement (R. 41, paragraph
20).

Appellant at all times performed all of the stipulations,

conditions, and agreements stated in the subject Agreement in the
manner therein specified.

However, Respondent refused either to

pay the sum of $10,000.00 together with 10% thereon or to convey
to Appellant sufficient acreage to discharge the indebtedness.
On the 20th day of March, 1978, Appellant filed this action
1n the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County
against Respondent praying for conveyance of property, or in the
alternative, for repayment of the $10,000.00 plus 10% thereon.
Pursuant to stipulation of the

respective counsel,

Stipulation of Facts was submitted to the Court

(R.

a

joint

231-327)

followed by various memoranda of law and argument.

The parties

agreed

L.

to

dismiss

individually.

the

action

against

The District Court,

James

Knight

Honorable Peter F. Leary,

awarded Respondent a judgment of "no cause of action" against
Appellant on all causes of action set forth in his Complaint,
finding

that

said

"claims

are
6

barred

by

the

statute of
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1 imitations" ( R.

38 7-3 8 8,

391-3 9 6).

Appellant appeals from said

judgment.
V.
A.

ARGUMENT

APPELLANT'S CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO RECEIVE PROPERTY FROM RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ENFORCED.

Section 3 of the subject Agreement begins:
If Knight has not reimbursed each of the Parties of
the First Part in full for all sums advanced by him
as aforesaid, plus 10 percent, by July 1, 1968, each
or any of the Parties of the First Part may request
Knight to reconvey to said requesting party sufficient
of the acreage theretofore released to Knight from
the Jeremy Ranch, at the rate of $85.00 per acre to
fully satisfy and discharge any remaining unpaid balance
to said requesting party.
It does not, however, stipulate as to when this election
should take place.

When a provision in a contract requires that

an act be performed without specifying any time, Utah law implies
that it is to be done within a reasonable time under the
circumstances.

Bradford v. Alvey &

So~s,

621 P.2d 1240, 1242

(Utah 1980).
A "reasonable

time"

is defined

as "so much time as

is

necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the
contract or duty require should be done in a particular case."
Commercial Security Bank v. Johnson,
281 (1946).

10 Utah 342,

173 P.2d 277,

The only contractual requirements for Appellant's

exercise was that he be not fully reimbursed by Respondent before
July 1,

1968,

and

that

he

choose

7

acreage

from
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property

theretofore released.

Thus, the option came into existence on

that date.
As stipulated and admitted by Respondent, any attempted
exercise by Appellant of the option prior to October, 1974 would
have been undisputedly futile.
occasion

technically passed

Although title may have on

through

Respondent,

it

had

no

alienable title to the property which it could give Plaintiff (R.
235, paragraph 6(b)).

In May,

1970,

Respondent became a

beneficiary to a Trust Deed executed for the purchase of the
property by Emigration

(&

238, paragraph 11).

Respondent still

had no legal title to the property such as could be transferred
to Appellant in lieu of installment payments.
which

Respondent admits holding

clear

The first date to

title

to

any of the

property isf approximately October, 1974, when it received 10
acres as a settlement with Emigration

{R.

240, paragraph 19(a)).

Although October of 1974 was the first time that Appellant could
effectively exercise

any portion of its option,

sufficient

acreage to satisfy the full obligation was yet unavailable.
Between 1970 and 1973, the Respondent was involved in a
lawsuit with other parties to the subject Agreement.

Those

parties were also seeking payment in land or money pursuant to
their rights under the Agreement.

At that time, Appellant was

encouraged by Respondent not to join in that action and was given
assurances that he would be paid in full if he would be patient.
In view of the facts that Respondent had no property until late
1974, that Responent had pursuaded Appellant not to join the
earlier action promising full payment later,
8

and that Appellant
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was thereafter

temporarily incapacitated by a serious heart

attack, Appellant's demand of February 7, 1978 must be considered
to be an exercise of that option within a reasonable time.

The

circumstances of this case dictate that a reasonable period must
extend at least until the option holder is aware of either the
ability of the obliger to perform or the obliger's intent not to
do so.

Any finding of the trial court to the contrary must be

overturned as against the evidence.
Before the lower Court, Respondent construed Section 3 as
giving Appellant the right to request property only from acreage
released prior to July 1, 1968, regardless of when said option is
exercised.

The Section is not unambiguous, but Appellant asserts

that its intended and more logical meaning is to allow Appellant
to request property from acreage released prior to that request.
The date of July 1, 1968 clearly indicates the date upon which
the option is first exercisable, but does not limit the property
which may be chosen.
from

property,

Appellant has a contractual right to select

"theretofore"

repayment from Respondent.
on July 1,

released by ESLIC,

in lieu of

That right first came into existence

1968 and continued as an available option for

a

reasonable time.
Appellant has reason to believe that Respondent presently
has or has had, during the pendency of this lawsuit, title to a
certain
19(b,c)).

amount

of

the

subject

property

(R.

240,

paragraph

However, Respondent has not been willing to disclose

the description of the specific property so held.

9
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Appellant,

thus, .1s entitled to have Security Title Company, the escrow
holder, select from the acreage held by Respondent "sufficient of
the acreage . • . to fully satisfy and discharge any remaining
unpaid balance" to Appellant (R.
1.

278,

Section 3).

If 129 4 acres are not presently available, Appellant
has a right to money damages equal to the fair market
value of the unavailable acreage at Jeremy Ranch.

Respondent,

at various times through this lawsuit, claimed

that it presently owns few, if any, acres of the Jeremy Ranch
property.

If true, specific performance of the option provision

in Section 3 of the Agreement would be impossible.
[S]ince equity does not undertake to do a vain and
useless thing, and does not grant a decree of specific
performance when it appears that the Defendant is
unable to comply with his contract - no decree of
specific performance will issue against a vendor in
a land contract who has no title or interest in the
land that he contracted to convey . . . .
71 Am. Jur. 2d, Specific Performance, §126 (1973).

Applying the rule to an option contract in Lowe v. Har!!!!!!!.'
115

P.2d

297,

302

(Or.

1941),

the

court

said,

"specific

performance will not be deemed against an optionor who is not
able, for want of title, to comply with the option contract."
In this case, however,

Respondent admits to its present

ownership of various interests in the Jeremy Ranch property but
is allegedly unable to convey the full title or the full amount
of proprty which
19(b,c)).

it contracted

Nevertheless,

to

sell

(R.

240,

paragraph

Appellant may elect to take any acreage

to which Respondent currently holds title;

10

the remainder of the
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judgment will be left to remedies at law.

71 Am.

Jur.

2d,

Specific Performance, §§116, 117 (1973).
Remedies

at law for

the vendor's breach of a contract

include the purchaser's loss of bargain plus any special damages
foreseeable at the time of contract.

The measure of damages for

breach of contract is described as "the amount which would have
been received if the contract had been performed, which means the
value of the contract, including the profits and advantages which
are its direct results and fruits."
{1965).

22 Am. Jur.

2d, Damages, §47

This general rule was recognized by the Utah Supreme

Court in Ste_!!art v. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 218 P. 959, 961 (1923),
and applied to land sale contracts in Smith v.

W~,

564 P.2d

771, 772 (Utah 1977).
The damages caused by breach of contract are to be measured
as of the date of the breach.
368 P.2d 597, 601 (1962).

Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83,

Appellant's demand for acreage was

made in February, 1978 (R. 241, paragraph 20).

It was not until

that date that Respondent breached its promise to convey land.
Since Respondent breached its contractual obligation to convey
129.4 acres to Appellant, and it contends that it does not now
have any interest in the Ranch beyond a few acres, Appellant is
entitled to any acreage currently owned by Respondent plus a
money judgment for the fair market value as of the date of breach
of the average remaining property such as would total 129.4
acres.

Both Appellant and Respondent agree that as of February,

1978,

the approximate value of the property in question was

$375.00 per acre (R. 241, paragraph 21).
11
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2.

AEpellant's claim for land or fai~ ~ark~t value thereof
is not barred by the statute of 11m1tat1ons.

Respondent's only defense to this action is that the statute
of limitations has lapsed and left Appellant without a legal
209).

Section 78-12-23 of the Utah Code Annotated

remedy

(R.

(1953,

as amended)

prescribes "an action upon any contract,

obligation or liability foundeo upon an instrument in writing,
except those mentioned in the preceding section" to be brought
within six years.

The statute of limitations begins to accrue on

the date of the breach of contract, not the date on which it was
signed or the date that performance provided therein might be
completed.
This Court declared that the statute of limitations does
"not begin to run until a suit or cause of action exists,"
Kimbal 1 v. _!icCo r _!:i ck, 8 0 Utah 18 9, 2 5 9 P. 313, 31 7 ( 19 2 6).
Court dealt with the question as to when a cause of

The

a~tion

accrues in State Tax Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 100
p. 2d 5 7 5'

5 7 7 ( 19 40) :

Ordinarily, a cause of action for a debt begins to run
when the debt is due and payable because at that time
an action can be maintained to enforce it. But when
some controlling statute or a contract existing
between the parties provides that an additional
thing be done before action may be brought, such as
a statutory provision that a return must be filed,
or, as in some insurance contracts, a provision
that suit may not be brought before a certain time
after the claimed loss, the statute of limitations
does not start to run until the time when suit may
be maintained even though interest on the amount of
the liability may begin to run from the time it is
due and payable.
(Emphasis added)

12
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Accordingly, a cause of action on a contract debt does not accrue
against the debtor until all of the requirements for payment to
the creditor have been met.
Appellant's contractual right to request property in
satisfaction of

any outstanding

amount due

and

owing

Respondent first arose on July 1, 1968 (R. 278, Section 3).

from
The

Agreement gave Appellant the option to choose from any property
theretofore released by ESLIC.

Each year from 1964 to 1967,

Respondent secured a release of property from ESLIC.

However,

these annual releases were only for so much property as would
garner proceeds on resale to pay each annual payment due to
ESLIC.

In fact, no releases would have been given at all if

ESLIC were not given all proceeds (other than transaction costs).
Transfer of the property through Respondent to the third party
would not be made until and unless all proceeds were paid to
ESLIC.
From 1964 through 1970, Respondent was unable to deliver
title to any of the property to Appellant.

There was no property

which had been released by ESLIC but not simultaneously sold to a
third party to meet the annual payment obligation on the 1961
Agreement (R.

236, paragraph 7).

Appellant's right to select

property first arose in 1968 since Respondent had not repaid him
in full.

But his election right was then hollow; there was no

available land which had yet been released to Respondent.
Section 3 required an affirmative "request" to be made by
Appellant to obligate Respondent to convey released property.
Until such request was made, Respondent had no duty to transfer
13
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title.

A cause of action could not accrue until this last

r~quirement

was fulfilled

by Appellant.

The

statute of

limitations could likewise not begin to run until the cause of
action acer ued.
B.

APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO MONEY DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT.
In the event that Appellant's claim for property pursuant to

Section 3 of the subject Agreement is conclusively found to be
without merit,

Appellant is entitled to money damages from

Respondent for breach of contract.
Section 2 of the subject Agreement states:
2. As consideration of the release given by each of
the parties of the first part, as set forth herein
below, Knight agrees to pay to Security Title Company,
Salt Lake City, Utah, as escrow holder for Parties of the
First Part 50 percent of the gross profits actually
realized by Knight from the resale of lands acquired
by Knight from the Jeremy Ranch until each of the
Parties of the First Part has been repaid the sum of
money advanced by him, as is set forth above, plus
10 percent thereof, with said repayment to be made
without interest. The term "gross profits", as used
herein, shall be computed as follows:
(a) The cost of the land to Knight shall be considered to be $85.00 per acre, which is the average
per acre price Knight has contracted to pay for the
entire 16,500 acres.
(b) All sums received by Knight from the resale
of any of the Jeremy Ranch land in excess of $85.00 per
acre shall be considered to be gross profits.
(c) Knight will retain the first $85.00 per acre
paid as his cost of the land and 50 percent of the
gross profits, to reimburse him for legal expense,
development expense, sales expense, etc.
(d) The other 50 percent of the gross profit
will be paid to Security Title Company of Salt Lake
City, as escrow holder for the use and benefit of the
14
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Parties of the First Part, and said escrow holder will
be i~structed to forthwith distribute pro rata all sums
received by the escrow holder to Parties of the First
Part. The monies so disbursed by the escrow holder
shall be pro rated among the Parties of the First Part,
so that each of said parties receives the same proportion of each disbursement as the money paid by him
to Knight, as aforesaid, bears to the total money paid
by all of the Parties of the First Part to Knight.
Respondent admits to the validity of the original debt and
its nonpayment thereof (R. 239-240) and asserts the statute of
limitations as its sole defense (R. 209).
1.

Appellant's claim for $10,000.00 plus ten percent
thereon is not barred by the statute of limitations.

The subject Agreement provides that Respondent was obligated
to repay to Appellant $10,000.00 plus 10% thereon only out of the
proceeds from the resale of Jeremy Ranch land (R. 282), Section
12).

If no sales were made nor proceeds received, Respondent had

no obligation to Appellant.

Furthermore, Respondent's obligation

to Appellant was only to be repaid out of "50 percent of the
gross profits actually realized"
of land (R.

277, Section 2).

acknowledge

the

ESLIC,

~y

Respondent from each resale

Finally, Appellant was made to

terms of Respondent's underlying contract with

which required annual principal payments of $160 ,000.00,

and that unless Respondent made those payments,

Appellant would

receive no repayment except from pre-default gross profits (R.
279, Section 5).
Appellant could not maintain a suit for the breach of this
contract until and unless (1) Respondent continued to make timely
payments to ESLIC,

(2) Respondent was able to resell portions of

the land released by ESLIC, (3) proceeds from the resales would

15
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include gross profits, and (4) those proceeds were not otherwise
required to fulfill payment obligations to ESLIC.

Until these

requirements were met, Respondent was not obligated to repay
Appellant, nor could Appellant enforce the contract through lgal
action.
The first proceeds free from obligation to the underlying
contract with ESLIC were received in the sale of land to
Emigration in 1970.

All sales prior to that date were of only so

much land as would be released by ESLIC to generate sufficient
funds to allow Respondent to make

its annual $160,000.00

payments.
In the lower Court, Respondent asserted that because each
resale of property,

beginning in 1964,

produced proceeds in

excess of $85.00 per acre, and since none of said proceeds were
paid to Appellant, each resale also constituted an actual breach
of contract and started the statute of limitations to run (R.
214-217).

This contention

ignores

the

clear

intent of the

contracting parties as evidenced in the Agreement.

The paramount

concern of the parties was to keep the contract with ESLIC
current.

Without the option on the land, neither party could

enjoy anticipated profits.

The apparent purpose of Section 5 of

the Agreement was the acknowledgment of the primacy of that ESLIC
obligation.
In May of 1970, Respondent received $500,000.00 down and a
schedule of installments for

the outstanding

balance of

$1,600,000.00 pursuant to the sale of 12,500 acres to Emigration.

16
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This was the first receipt of proceeds by Respondent from the
resale

of

land,

which

proceeds

immediately transferred to ESLIC.

were

not

required

to

However, Appellant was not

entitled to be repaid until gross profits on the sale
actually realized

(R.

277,

be

Section 2).

According

were

to

the

Agreement, Respondent was to "retain the first $85.00 per acre
and

50

percent

of

the

entitled to any payment.

gross

profits"

before

Appellant

was

Defined as "sums received . . . in

excess of $85.00 per acre," no gross profits would be realized on
the 1970 sale until $1,062,500.00 was received from Emigration.
Appellant, therefore, was not entitled to any repayment, nor
could the Agreement be considered breached by Respondent until
the

first

realization

of

"free"

gross

profits

in

1973.

Considering the date of actual breach, the institution of these
proceedings in 1978

is

well

within the six-year statute of

limitations.
2.

Any potential disabling statute of limitations tolled
with Respondent's payment to Appellant's co-obligees
under the subject Agreement.

The earliest time a breach of contract by Respondent could
have occurred
received.

was 1973 when "free" gross profits were first

However, in 1974, two of Appellant's fellow investors

were paid pursuant to the same contract.

Utah Code Annotated

§78-12-44, 1953, as amended, states that:
In any case founed on contract, when any part of the
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an
acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or
claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall have
been made, an action may be brought within the
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period prescribed for the same after such payment
acknowledgment or promise . . . .
Payments pursuant to litigation were made to J. Kent Buehler
and Richard D. Madsen in 1974, within the six-year statute of
limitations of any possible breach {R. 233-234, 286-289).

The

payments were made by Respondent with a written settlement
pursuant to the same Agreement that is contested in this case.
Madsen and Buehler were partners with Appellant at the time the
original debt arose, and all were treated as an entity entitled
"Parties of the First Part" throughout the Agreement.
In

Di

x on v • Ba r t 1 e t t , 1 7 6 Ca 1 . 5 7 2 , 1 6 9 P . 2 3 6 ( 1 9 1 7 )_, a

letter acknowledging a contract debt addressed to one partner was
held sufficient to toll the statute against all the partners.

In

Krause v. S2urgeon, 256 S.W. 1072 (Mo. App. 1923), part payment
to one of two joint holders of a note was sufficient to toll the
statute of limitations against both holders.
Hiscock, 240 N.W. 50 (Mich. 1932), payment

t()

In Hiscock v.

one of several co-

owners of a mortgage which had been barred by the statute of
limitations acted to revive the mortgage to all mortgagees.
The

payments

settlements to

of

cash

Madsen and

and

Buehler

limitations against Appellant.
began anew in 1974.

land

accompanied
tolled

by

written

the statute of

Thus, the period of limitation

The action brought in 1978 was within the

six-year period.
3.

Even if applicable, the statute of limitations would bar
only a portion of Appellant's claim.

18
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Section 4 of the subject Agreement allows Appellant to
"continue to receive his pro-rated share of the gross prof its
until he has been reimbursed if he has not been fully reimbursed
by

July

1,

1968."

The

alternative

opinion

was

to

recover

sufficient land at the rate of $85.00 per acre to satisfy his
account.

The language of this alternative requires a "request to

reconvey" whereas the desire to continue in profit participation
necessitates no such notice.
prior to the 1978 demand,

No request was made by Appellant
and Respondent apparently assumed

Appellant's election was to wait for payment from gross profits.
Section 13 of the Agreement anticipates Respondent selling
its interest in the property "as an entity" and outlines
Appellant's rights in such a sale.

The sale to Emigration on May

8, 1970 was, indeed, the sale of Respondent's entire remaining
interest in the Ranch and would apparently be subject to this
section.

However, the particular clauses of this section specify

sales consummated by December 31, 1968:
(c)
If Knight receives an installment sale contract
which would be paid off in full before December 31,
1968, then Knight will, from each payment he receives,
pay to First Parties (i.e., Fredericksen), as aforesaid, the same proportion of the amount due to each of
them as payment made to Knight bears to the total
purchase price to Knight.
(d)
If the installment payments are accepted by
Knight extending the term of payment beyond 1969,
then Knight will, nevertheless, pay First Parties
in full from the funds so received by December 31,
1968. The annual payments shall be equal.
In the lower Court,
inapplicable

to

the

Respondent contended that although

Emigration

sale,

subsection
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(d)

offers

guidance in the interpretation of the intent of the parties to
not "string out the payments for the Plaintiff."

Certainly, the

Agreement was not intended to indefinitely postpone payments to
Appellant.

Neither was the intent to force full

payment to

Appellant and his co-associates upon the initial installment
payment which may have had a crippling effect on Respondent's
cash

flow.

This

factor

is especially relevant

in light of

Responent's admission that there were liens against the property
exceeding the $500,000.00 down payment made by Emigration in May,
1 9 7 0 ( R. 2 3 7 , par a g r a p h 1 0 ) .
The only reasonable interpretation of Sections 2, 4, and 13
extended to 1970 and beyond is that Appellant should have the
option to continue to wait for
Respondent;

profits to be realized by

that receipts from the installment contract between

Respondent and Emigration should be first used to recover its
cost of land ($85.00 per acre), and that only then should
Appellant get his total amount due out of one-half the gross
profits received.

Thus, the controlling provisions for payments

to Appellant would be Sections 2 and 4 continuing until gross
prof its were realized.

Section 13 is inapplicable since it

contemplates only an exception to Section 4 which did not arise.
Nevertheless, Section 13 is useful as a tool in understanding the
intentions of the contracting parties.
In

the

event

that

the

f i r st

b r each

of

Respondent ' s

obligation to Appellant is found to have occurred in 1970 upon
Appellant's sale to Emigration and receipt by Respondent of the

20
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$500,000.00 down payment, and it is further held that the prior
payments to Madsen and Buehler did not toll

the statute of

limitations, it must also be found that the breach of contract
was not singular but a repeated breach which created a new cause
of action each time Respondent failed to pay out of the gross
profits from each installment payment received.

This reasoning

appears consistent with Appellant's installment sale treatment of
the 1970 sale (R. 220-222).

The provisions of subsection 13(c)

offer guidance for such an installment sale.

Respondent had a

duty to pay to Appellant the same proportion of the amount due
him as Emigration's installment payment made to Responent bears
to the total $2,100,000.00 purchase price.
Installment

sales

are

treated

uniquely by statutes of

limitation.
In case of an obligation payment by installments, the
statute of limitations runs against each installment
from the time when an action might be brought to
recover it . . . [T]he rule that the statute of
limitations begins to run against each installment
of an obligation payable. by installments only from
the time the installment becomes due applies although
the debtor has the option to pay the entire indebtedness at any time.
51 Arn. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions §133 (1970).
Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized this principle in Indian Territory

Illu~inating

349 (1941).

Oil Co. v.

Rosa~ond,

190 Okla. 146, 120 P.2d

The court held that a continuing covenant to make

payments when breached gives rise to a cause of action each day
breached.
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The reason for the rule is while the repeated and
successive breaches of the implied covenant continue, the right of action for subsequent breaches
does not accrue upon the first breach, but accrues
and the statute begins to run as and when each
breach occurs. Like an account not mutual in nature,
but all on one side, the cause of action arises on
the date of each item or breach, and the items
within the statutory period of limitations do not draw
after them those of longer standing.
120 P.2d at 352-53.
In Bank of America Trust & Savings Ass'n. v. McLaughlin, 152
C.A. 2d 911, 313 P.2d 220,223 (1957), the court ruled on a note
payable in installments, several of which had not been paid and
against which the statute had run.

"Where money is payable in

installments, the statute of limitations begins to run against
the cause of action for the recovery of an unpaid installment at
the time it is payable."
Section 4 of the subject Agreement states that if Appellant
had not been fully reimbursed by July 1, 1968, he was entitled to
"receive his pro-rated share of gross prof its until he has been
reimbursed."

The sale to Emigration on May 8,

installment contract.

1970

was an

Appellant was thereby entitled to payments

on a pro rata basis out of the 50 percent of the gross profits
realized from each installment.

If it is held that Respondent

did not have a right to keep the first $85.00 per acre, but that
the payments to Appellant should be proportionate to Emigration's
installment payments,

the

amounts due

Appellant,

$11,00.00 due in 1970, are listed below:
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based on

SCHEDULE OF RECEIPTS AND AMOUNT DUE

May, 1970
April, 1971
April, 1972
April, 1973 (Remainder)

Receipt. from
Emigra.tion
$
500,000.00
75,000.00
75,000.00
1,449,000.00

Under this installment approach,
limitations began to

run for

Percent
23.8
3.6
3.6
69.0

Amount Due
$ 2,618.00
396.00
399.00
7,590.00

even if the statute of

a breach of the contract by

Respondent in 1970, this running would not affect the payments
made in 1972 and 1973 since the Complaint was filed in March,
1978.

Approximately $7,986.00 is within the statute and

accessible.
This determination of installment contract applicability is
one which avoids a forfeiture by Appellant.

The courts are

usually eager to construe contracts to avoid forfeitures "which
are regarded as odius to the law."
428,

286 P.2d 229

(1955).

Morgan v. Sorenson, 3 Utah 2d

In Russell v. Park City Utah Corpora-

tion, 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P.2d 1274 (1973), this Court inferred
that a party who seeks to enforce a forfeiture should be in
strict compliance of forfeiture prerequisites.

"(T]he general

rule that one who seeks to invoke a forfeiture must strictly
comply with the prerequisites thereof because forfeitures are not
favored in the law."

Al though this is not a case of contractual

forfeiture provisions, the principle should be extended.

A court

in equity will not construe a contract in favor of a party which
ls continually defaulted in its payments over one who has already
given its consideration and is in danger of losing its entire
cause of action.
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C.

APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE ACCRUING
SINCE THE MATURITY DATE OF THE OBLIGATION PLUS ALL COURT
COSTS INCURRED INCLUDING A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE.

The subject Agreement provides that Appellant receive his
contribution of $10,00-0.00 plus 10% thereon, but includes no
interest.

This Agreement and its obligations were obviously

intended to be satisfied and fulfilled by December 31, 1968.
anticipate~

was not

by the contracting parties nor

It

is it

reasonable to assume that Respondent should have had use of
Appellant's $10,000.00 for more than 17 years with only 10% added
thereto.
Utah Code Annotated, §14-1-1 (1953, as amended) provides:
"The legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any
money,

goods,

annum."
no

or things in action shall be six percent per

This statute was amended in 1981, but the amendment has

effect

on

this

obligation.

The

majority

of

ruling

jurisdictions have supported the rule that the rate of interest
after

maturity upon an obligation,

reciting

a certain rate

expressly until maturity and silent as to the rate thereafter, is
the legal rate.

16 A.L.R. 2d 902.

In Allen v. Miller, 84 N.W.

2d 571 (N.D. 1957), the court held that a note payable without
interest before maturity and silent as to interest after maturity
bears interest at the legal rate from the date of default to date
of payment or to date that judgment is entered.
In Bjork v. April Industries, Inc.,

560 P.2d 315,

317 (Utah

1977), this Court commented on the availability of prejudgment
interest:
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As to the allowance of interest before judgment, this
Court has heretofore spoken, and the law in Utah is
clear, viz: where the damage is complete and the
amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time,
and that loss can be measured by facts and figures,
interest should be allowed from that time and not
from the date of the judgment.
Appellant's right to repayment in cash matured in 1973 when
Respondent had sufficient "free" gross profits to satisfy their
contractual obligation.

If the Court finds that the Respondent

breached its contractual obligation, Appellant is entitled to
interest on the $11,000.00 accruing at 6% per annum from 1973
until the entry of judgment herein.
Appellant's right to property or the fair market value of
same natured in February,

1978 when Appellant exercised his

contractual option to demand 129.4 acres.

If the Court decides

that Appellant is entitled to a conveyance of property, he is
also entitled

to

interest on the fair

property as of 1978,

from February,

market value of that

1978 until the entry of

judgment herein.
Utah law is clear

~hat

attorney's fees are chargeable to an

opposing party only if there
liability therefor.
1977).

is a contractual or

statutory

Stubbs v. He!!!!!!.ert, 567 P.2d 168, 171 (Utah

The Agreement provides:

Should any of the parties breach this agreement, and the other be required to secure legal
counsel to enforce it, the defaulting party agrees
to pay all court costs incurred and a reasonable
attorney's fee for the enforcement of the agreement.
(R. 284, paragraph 16).
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Respondent has admitted breaching the Agreement (R. 239-241,
paragraphs 14-17, 20).

It is clear that AI?pellant was required

to secure legal counsel to enforce the Agreement.

If the Court

finds in favor of Appellant on any of his claims, he is also
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The District Court's ruling is contrary to law and equity.
The District Court has, without legally valid grounds, undertaken
to relieve Respondent from the burden of a lawful and valid
contract.
Based on the analysis set forth above,

Appellant 1s

entitled, pursuant to the subject Agreement and his request of
February 6, 1978, to a conveyance of 129.4 acres of the property
known as Jeremy Ranch.
Agreement

at

Said conveyance is authorized by the 1963

Appellant's option

Respondent's acknowledged

1n

lieu of payments on

unpaid contractual debt.

Appellant's

request, therefor, was reasonably made under the circumstances
and was the last act required of Appellant before Respondent's
obligation to convey matured.
If Responent does not now have title to 129.4 acres of the
subject property, it should be required to convey to Appellant so
much of said property as is now in its ownership.
his obligation should

The balance of

then be satisified by the payment to

Appellant of the 1978 fair market value of so many of the 129.4
acres which are not so conveyed.
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In the event that Respondent is not found to be obligated to
convey property to Appellant,

Appellant

is entitled

acknowledged contract debt in his favor

to

the

in the amount of

$11,000.00.

Finally,

only if the Court finds that Appellant is not

entitled to a conveyance of property and that Respondent breached
its contractual obligations giving rise to a valid cause of
action prior to 1973, Appellant is entitled to the proceeds of
each installment not lost by any alleged running of the statute
of limitations.
In any event, Appellant is entitled to interest accruing at
the legal rate since maturity of the obligation, all Court costs,
and a reasonable attorney's fee incurred in these proceedings for
the enforcement of the subject Agreement as provided in that
Agreement.
The

District

Court's

judgment

should

be

reversed

remanded for entry of jvdgment in favor of Appellant.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

!J

day of

<z-~

1982.

ROBERT F. ORTON
T. RICHARD DAVIS
Marsden, Orton & Liljenquist

Attorneys for Appellant
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and

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing
Brief to be mailed to Edward W. Clyde and Ted Boyer of Clyde,
Pratt, Gibb & Cahoon, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101, this

/1

day of February, 1982.

<],~~'
T. Richard Davis
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